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oﬀers  a  concise  empirical  exposition  of  the  centrality  of  household 
lending  and  related ﬁnancial  services to  leading  banking institutions 
and to the credit systems of a number of advanced and middle‐income 
economies. It also oﬀers socioeconomic  characterizations of this debt 





crisis  characterized  by  record  levels  of  over‐indebted  wage‐earning 
households  is  likely  to  pose  distinctive  diﬃculties  to  a  process  of 
market‐based recovery. While the destruction of capital values during a 
crisis  lays  the  basis  for  the  eventual  restoration  of proﬁtability  and 
solvency for some enterprises, over‐indebted  wage‐earning households 




















in  the  relative  importance  of  risk  management  services  and  traditional  information 
gathering  functions.  Erturk  and  Solari  (2007)  have emphasized the  importance  of  bank 
















2 These include Whalen (2007), Wray (2007, 2008), Kregel (2008). from  productive  and  towards  ﬁnancial  activities.  The  authors  identify  this  shift  as  an 











changes  in  capitalism  over  the  past  three  decades.  Financial  liberalization,  the  rise  of 
institutional  investors,  and  changing  ﬁnancial  behavior  by  non‐ﬁnancial  corporations 
eroded traditional banking and forced banks to look for new business and funding sources. 
Wage stagnation, growing inequality and the steady expansion of private provision of basic 





The  current  crisis  may be understood as a crisis of the distinctive type of banking  that 
emerged through these changes. First, it was triggered by the subprime meltdown, which 
developed as banks sought to extend household lending to historically oppressed segments 








6 See Wilhelm and Morris (2007). And second, recent  household  lending has also  given  rise to  record levels  of household 
indebtedness across many economies. The current crisis has seen large numbers of over‐
indebted  households  in  those  countries  face  increasing  diﬃculties  in  servicing  debt. 
Widespread ﬁnancial distress by large numbers of ﬁnal consumers represents a distinctive 
feature of  the current  international  recession  that is likely to  condition signiﬁcantly the 
prospects for economic recovery. 
A Marxian  approach to these developments aﬀords two  distinctive insights motivated in 
detail  in this essay. First,  by pitting households aiming to  secure access to  consumption 
against ﬁnancial enterprises seeking to maximize proﬁts, household debt has in the present 
context created social relations that are systematically disadvantageous to borrowers. Such 
disadvantages  underpin  the  high  eﬀective  interest  rates  realized  by  lenders  and  the 




Second and most signiﬁcantly, there are good theoretical  reasons to  expect that  a crisis 
triggered and characterized by over‐indebtedness by wage earning  households will  pose 
distinctive  diﬃculties  to  the  process  of  recovery.  At  the  broadest  level,  Marx  (1909) 
identiﬁed  a  number  of  mechanisms  through  which  the  devastation  of  capital  values 
(including wages paid to variable capital) ushered by an industrial crisis creates the very 
bases for an eventual  recovery of proﬁtability. Such a recovery improves the solvency  of 
indebted  enterprises,  facilitates  ﬁnancial  stabilization,  and  fosters  broader  economic 




disruptions,  and  further limiting  household  demand.  In  such  a  setting,  it  is  likely  that 
recessions will prove unusually long lasting without signiﬁcant state intervention into labor 
and ﬁnancial markets. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  two  documents  the  changes  in  the 
conduct  of  banks  and  the  related  reorientations  of  credit  systems  toward  credit  to 
households.  It  also  oﬀers  a  discussion  of  the  broad  policy,  labor‐  and  ﬁnancial‐market 
factors  conditioning  these developments.  Section  three oﬀers a conceptualization  of  the 
6diﬀerent social  relations associated with lending  to  capitalist  enterprises and lending  to 
individual wage earners, based on Marxian schemas of reproduction. On these grounds, the 
section  identiﬁes  possible  grounds  for  systematically  higher  eﬀective  interest  rates  in 
lending to wage‐earning households for purposes of consumption. 
Section four oﬀers initial analytical considerations suggesting that recovery from a recession 




over the past  25 years.  Lending has been  reoriented away from  loans  to enterprises and 




shift  in  the sources  of  bank  proﬁts,  away from  the  proﬁts of productive  enterprise and 
towards the wage income of ordinary people. 
Record levels of household debt have followed these developments. Rising indebtedness has 




in  Britain,  and  other  OECD  economies.  They  are also  evident  in  many  middle‐income 
economies, where leading US and European banks have led these transformations over the 
past 15 years.7 This section brieﬂy documents these changes in bank behavior, their impact 





individual  wage  revenue.  Activities  and  revenues  centre  signiﬁcantly  on  lending  to 
individuals, money‐dealing fees on retail accounts, and the provision of retail insurance and 
7
7 See dos Santos (2009b). investment  fund  services.  Lending  to  individuals  is  clearly  a  major  lending  activity  for 
leading international banks, especially those from the US.
Table 1 ‐ Loans to Individuals as Percentage of Total Loan Portfolio, December 2006
HSBC Citigroup B of A RBS Barclays Paribas Dresdner SMFG
40.5 77.7 76.3 24.0 44.0 33.0 20.1 26.8
Source: dos Santos (2009a)






That  same  year  HSBC’s  “Personal  Financial  Services”  segment,  which  focuses  on 
consumption and mortgage credit, generated US$9.5 billion in proﬁts, 42.9 percent of the 
total, ahead of commercial and investment banking divisions, which accounted for 27.3 and 
26.3  percent  of  proﬁts  respectively.  Central  to  this  performance  is  HSBC’s  credit  card 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above 20  percent. A full  42 percent  of the funds reported proﬁt  margins higher than 30 
percent. Funds targeting retail investors were reportedly the most proﬁtable. 
2.2 The Growing Burden and Proﬁts of Debt
These activities have turned the  debt  of households into  a  major  component  of  overall 
private debt across a number of economies. In Mexico, Estonia, Romania and Poland, where 
leading  international  banks  have  come  to  dominate  banking  markets,  bank  loans  to 
households stood respectively at 40.0, 46.6, 49.8 and 54.1 percent of total bank credit by the 














0 ‐ 20 20 ‐ 39.9 40 ‐ 59.9 60 ‐ 79.9 80 ‐ 89.9 90 – 100
1989 87.5 86.0 84.7 95.9 83.7 60.2





related  services,  reached  a  record  19.39  percent  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  2007.  Despite 
signiﬁcant interest rate cuts since then, it still stood at 19 percent one year later, a level only 
reached during the height of the real estate boom in mid‐2005. 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Bank  of  England  ﬁgures  on  realized  eﬀective  interest  rates  show  a  consistent  three 
percentage  point  premium  on  returns  on  unsecured overdraft  loans  to  households over 
equivalent loans to non‐ﬁnancial corporations between 2004 and 2008.15 
   
   
   
   
   


















































































































































































































































































                                                                        







into  dominant  market  share,  acquiring  Associates,  Bank  One,  British‐based MBNA,  and 
Providian. After 2004, the top ten US issuers controlled over 90 percent of the market, and 
counted only one independent, non‐bank enterprise.18 During the real estate boom of the 


















been  greatly  reduced.  Financial  liberalization  intensiﬁed  capital‐market  competition  for 
banks, while the rise of private pension savings contributed to an explosion in the issuance 
of corporate bonds starting in the US sine the early 1980s. Non‐ﬁnancial corporations have 












at  considerable  geographical  removes  from  banks’  head  oﬃces,  on  the  basis  of  ‘hard’ 
quantitative estimates of creditworthiness.20 
As discussed above, the high relative proﬁtability of this type of lending compelled banks 
























24 See NIPA and IRS data, which document these tendencies respectively.  falling  trends  in  investment  and  income  resumed  quickly  from  2001.  From  then  on,  as 
Greenspan himself candidly notes,
  “Consumer spending carried the economy through the post 9/11 malaise, and what 
  carried  consumer  spending  was  housing.  In  many  parts  of  the  United  States, 
  residential real estate, energized by the fall in mortgage interest rates, began to see 















   






   
   
   



































































































































































































































































































































                                                                                         












































governing  borrowers’  need  for  credit.  This  section  illustrates  these  diﬀerences  with  a 
comparison, at the highest level of abstraction, of the social content of lending to capitalist 
enterprises  and  that  of  lending  to  wage‐earning  households  based  on  classical  Marxist 
analysis of LMC and the process of reproduction of each class of borrower. 
3.1 Lending to Capitalist Enterprises
The  process  of  social reproduction of capitalist  enterprises  in  Marxist  political  economy 
involves the  self‐expansion of value  through  the appropriation  of  surplus  value.  This is 
achieved as capital is transformed into commodities labor power and means of production, 
C(lp,mp). Those are combined in the production of new commodities, whose sale allows the 

































capital  and  disruptive  of  accumulation.29   Its  repayment  poses  elements  of  borrower 
expropriation,  as  repayments  may  require  the  liquidation  of  assets  and  the  transfer  to 
lenders of value secured by the borrowing enterprise independently of the loan. 







Matters  are fundamentally diﬀerent  in credit  relations between banks and wage‐earning 
households. Under capitalist conditions wage earners have no means other than the sale of 





This reproduction is fundamentally diﬀerent  from  that of LMC and industrial  capital.  Its 
purpose does not relate to changing quantitative magnitudes, which stay constant at every 
step.  It  lies  in  the  qualitative  diﬀerence  between  the  original  commodity  and  the 
commodities  accessed.  The  governing  imperative  in  this  process  is  the  fulﬁllment  of 











A  perspective  far  more  likely  to  yield  fruitful  research  has  been  recently  advanced  by 




31 See Miles (2004), Campbell and Cocco (2003), for illustrations. changes in household ﬁnance’.32   Under this  light, the motivations  and social  content  of 
household  debt  and consequent  ﬂows  of  interest  payments  should  be  understood  with 








Second,  in  this  borrowing  wage‐earning  households  are  primarily  concerned  with  the 
satisfaction of qualitative consumption needs, as represented by (4). And while in this pursuit 





provision of  housing,  health,  and education,  wage earners have  been increasingly forced 
onto debt relations in order to secure their own reproduction. The distinguishing general 
features  of  consumption  debt  and  this  element  of  social  compulsion  suggest  that  the 
transfers of wage income in the form of interest payments may be usefully understood as 
usurious and containing an important exploitative element. 
They  also  help  identify  the  general  class  and  concrete  historical  bases  for  the  high 
proﬁtability generally associated with this type of lending. High rates of proﬁt, in turn, made 
this  lending  particularly  well‐suited  for  the  development  of  excesses  in  the  process  of 
ﬁnancial market competition, and helped pave the way to the current crisis. At the broadest 













Even  neoclassical  economists  have  sought  to  identify  in  debt  and  its  associated 
‘transactional problems’ potential sources for the propagation in time of one‐oﬀ exogenous 
shocks.36  
These and  related  contributions have helped oﬀer insights  into  a  number of  important 
elements of the current crisis.37 But in themselves, they provide scant bases for approaching 




















Second  and  most  signiﬁcantly,  recovery  from  a  crisis  triggered  and  characterised  by 
unprecedented  levels  of  household  debt  poses  a  range  of  distinctive  diﬃculties.  The 
depression in the values of all forms of capital during a classical industrial crisis helps create 
the conditions  for the eventual recovery of proﬁt rates, ﬁnancial  stability,  and  aggregate 
demand. Capitalist  enterprises able to  pursue operational  and ﬁnancial  restructuring,  or 
simply capable of securing access to  funds, may ﬁnd attractive pickings amid the general 
carnage  of  a  depression.  Wage  earners,  in  contrast,  face  no  analogous  vulturous 
opportunities. Deﬂation in consumer goods does not in itself facilitate ‘restructuring’, the 
development of new income sources, and eventual boosts in demand. In fact, improvements 







For  Marx,  capitalism  is  incapable  of  sustained  and  stable  accumulation  and  the 
corresponding  development  of  productive  capacities  and  living  standards.  Competition, 
individual  appropriation  and  the  corollary  economic  anarchy  help  render  the  system 
vulnerable to disruptions to proﬁtability, its very organizing principle. Marx and subsequent 
contributions to Marxist political economy have advanced a number of inherent processes 
that  tend  to  erode  proﬁtability  in  contemporary  capitalism.  Those  include  tendencies 







process  of  capital:  means  of  production  and  labour  power  organized  according  to  the 
21





the  fortunes  of the  competitive struggle,  which  assigns the  loss in  very diﬀerent 

















Variable  capital  also  depreciates  through  reductions  in  wages,  as  ‘The  stagnation  of 
production would have laid oﬀ a part of the working‐class and thereby placed the employed 
part in a condition, in which they would have to submit to a reduction of wages, even below 












the  proportion  of  variable  to  the  constant  capital,  and  thereby  to  release  some 
labourers....  The  depreciation  of  the  elements  of  constant  capital  itself  would  be 
another factor tending to raise the rate of proﬁt. The mass of the employed constant 
capital, compared to the variable, would have increased, but the value of this mass 




In  contemporary  terms,  a  setting  of  falling  prices  for  capital  goods,  labor  inputs,  and 
corporate securities, create opportunities for restored rates of proﬁt for some enterprises. 
Firms that  happen to  be in  better ﬁnancial states,  or simply to  possess  better access to 
ﬁnance, will generally be in a position to implement operational and ﬁnancial restructuring 
measures that buttress their proﬁtability, improve their solvency, and boost demand.
















Falling  equity  prices may  facilitate  corporate  takeovers and  other types of mergers  and 
acquisitions.  These  may  be  undertaken  in  conjunction  with  the  pursuit  of  the  various 












content  of  household  indebtedness  throws  up  distinctive  obstacles  to  the  process  of 
economic recovery unlikely to be surmounted without signiﬁcant state intervention. 
The  crisis  has  placed  millions  of  households  under  considerable  ﬁnancial  distress. 
Wholesale funding and securitization of loans to households have all but disappeared, while 
on‐book  bank  lending  has also  contracted severely. This  has  cut  credit  ﬂows  that  were 
increasingly central  to  sustaining household consumption. As  shown in  ﬁgure 3, US  net 
household borrowing as a share of consumption and residential investment had reached 





2009.43   And  while  the  reduction  of  base  rates  has  doubtlessly  improved  the  ﬁnancial 
position of many indebted households, overall debt and servicing costs measured in relation 
to personal  disposable income are yet to fall signiﬁcantly, as suggested by ﬁgures 1 and 2 








   






















































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                                                         









not  in  themselves  oﬀer  wage‐earning  households  new  opportunities  to  increase  their 
incomes and improve ﬁnancial solvency.45 
At the broadest level, there is limited scope for operational and ﬁnancial restructuring of 
households.46   Fundamental  adjustments  in  consumption  are  likely  to  be  much  more 
diﬃcult and socially disruptive than corporate restructuring.  Further, consumption is an 
inalienable process, and individual consumers cannot be ‘taken over’ and ‘restructured’ by 










                                                                                                                               
                                                                                           
                         











depth  of  the  Great  Depression  have  long  been  attributed  in  considerable  part  to  the 
downward inﬂexibility of wages.47 
Herein  lies  a  distinctive  paradox  posed  by  recovery  from  a  recession  characterized  by 
ﬁnancial  distress by  wage‐earning households. A recovery led by capitalist  enterprises is 












At  the  broadest  level,  during  typical  industrial  crises  falling  wages  and  inﬂation  eﬀect 
transfers and  shifts  of value  from  ﬁnancial  enterprises  and  wage earners  to  productive 
capitalist enterprises. Because those enterprises monopolize the appropriation of new value, 











Drawing on Marxist  political economy,  this essay has sought to  document the economic 









the  usurious  and  exploitative  character  of  lending  to  wage‐earning  households,  as  it 
developed in the concrete setting  of rising  inequality and privatization of the past three 
decades,  that  made  it  highly  proﬁtable.  High  proﬁtability  made  it  a  natural  locus  for 
destructive processes of ﬁnancial competition and instability. 
Second, record levels of household indebtedness pose distinctive diﬃculties for the process 





Analytically,  the  preliminary  discussions  oﬀered  here  point  to  the  need  for  robust 
conceptualizations  of  credit  relations  in  the  process  of  accumulation,  including  the 
distinctive social content of credit to wage‐earning households. At the level of policy, this 
essay points to the need for a series of state interventions to facilitate transfers to wage‐
earning  households—through gains  in real  wages,  reductions  in  inequality, and growing 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